The structure of Malaysian audit market: From 2008 to 2010 by Mohamad Nor, Mohamad Naimi & Abidin, Shamharir
The 3" IBEA international Conference on Business, Economics and Accounting 
15-17 April 2015, Ho Chi Mlnh City, Vietnam 
The Structure of Malaysian Audit Market: 
From 2008 to 2010 
Mohamad Naimi Mohamad-Nor 
naimi@uum.edu.my 
Shamharir Abidin 
School of Accountancy, College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia. 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study 1s to provide updated knowledge and detail on the structure of Moloysian 
audit market in the pre and post Audit Oversight Board (AOB) establishment. This study rncludes all Malaysian 
listed companies from 2008 to 2010. The examination of oudit market structure was based on rate of oudit fee 
per unit of size, oudit market concentration and rnd~vidual firm's market share. The results suggest Malaysia 
audit market can be described as tight oligopoly and there is slight changes in the market during the period 
2008 - 2010. The noted changes ore reduction of oudit supplies and the increment of audit fee. The results 
suggest evidence of economic of scale enjoyed by big size companies. l t  is interest~ng to note that, while Big 
Four are now reducing the number of oudit clients, they instead are focusing on larger clients. Focusing on big 
size companies possibly indicates a strategic move to avoid risky clients. Ernst & Young and 
PricewoterhouseCoopers are the most influential among Big Four firms, meanwh~le Crowe Harwath as non-Big 
Fourfirms, is enlarging its market share.This study contributes to the oudit market literature addressing the 
strategy adopted by audit firm in low litlgation risk environment. The study also examines the market po wer of 
non-Big Fourfirms in a developing country which is rorely investigated. 
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Introduction 
In Malaysia, study on auditor switching suggest that about 300 companies switched 
auditors from 1990 to 2008 (Syed Mustapha Nazri, Smith & Ismail, 2012).Meanwhile, earlier 
study by Joher et al. (2000) found 135 auditor switchings from 1986 to  1996.Even though 
the average switching rate per year is small, theincidence of switching indicates 
misalignment of auditor-client relationship in the market. 
Due to the dynamics of business nowadays, couple with a series of unpredicted 
economic crisis, the pattern of the audit market continues to changes (Hogan & Martin, 
2009), Several factors contributing to changes in the Malaysian audit market structure. For 
example, increased public scrutinisation against the auditor, amendment of business rules 
and regulations, and establishment of Audit Oversight Board (AOB). However, only a limited 
number of studies examine the audit market structure in light of the above development. 
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to provide updated knowledge and detail on the 
audit market structure. Prior studies on Malaysian audit market were only conducted up to 
the year 2003 (Rahmat & Iskandar, 2004; Md. Ali et al. 2008; Ishak, Mansor & Sutan 
Maruhun, 2013). Since then, no detailed study was carried out. 
Malaysia is included as a setting to achieve the research objectives due to relatively 
low market share of the large audit firms as compared to English speaking countries (Hope 
et  at., 2008; Yaacob & Che-Ahmad, 2012; Ferguson & Scott, 2014). With high percentage of 
companies hire non-Big Four firms an examination on fee differences across auditor types 
could be carried out (Carson et al. 2007). Second, Malaysia was regarded as a country with 
less effective legal institutions and limited scrutiny on audit firms (Johl, Jubb & Houghton, 
2007). 
The study contributes to auditing literature by providing an insight into difference 
strategy adopted by various types of auditors in strengthening their market power. For 
instance, Ireland and Lennox (2002) demonstrate that in a setting where fee premium is 
high, large audit firms are able to  attract high quality companies, therefore resulting in less 4 
audit effort and low audit fees. However, whether higher quality auditor could attract good 4 i 
clients in Malaysia, where the fee premium is low and litigation risk is uncommon remains 
unanswered. 
Malaysian audit market 
The dominance of large audit firms (i.e. Big Four that consist of Ernst & Young, 
Deloitte, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers or PwC) in the audit market is reflected by high 
percentage share in the market. In general, there are two measurements of audit market 
structure being employed by Malaysian's studies. The following section discusses prior 
studies based on the type of measurement employed, namely number of audits and audit 
fees. 
Number of a u d i t s  
Table I presents big firms' market share based on number of audits. 
Table I 
Large audit firms' market share from 1991 t o  2003, 2005 and 2007 
Author(s)/Year Year of study Sample size % of share 
(number of audlts) 
Mohd Iskandar, Maelah and Aman (2000) 1991 290 58.7 
Mohd Iskandar et al. (2000) 1992 324 59.9 
Mohd lskandar et al. (2000) 1993 328 63.5 
Mohd lskandar et a1.(2000) 1994 354 63.8 
Mohd lskandar et al. (2000) 1995 363 66.9 
Mohd lskandar et al. (2000) 1996 278 65.1 
Hariri, Abdul Rahman and Che Ahmad (2007) 1997 61 1 7 3 
Hariri et at. (2007) 1998 657 7 2 
Harlri et al. (2007) 1999 678 73 
Rahmat and Mohd lskandar (2004) 2001 679 65.4 
Che Ahmad, Shafie and Mohamad Yusof (2006b) 2002 819 73 
Yatlm, Kent and Clarkson (2006) 2003 736 68.8 
Johl, Subramaniam and Mat Zain (2012) 2005 559 68.5 
Rusmin et al. (2009) 2007 105 62 
Notes: 
1. Study on large audit firms' market share in Malaysia for 2004 and 2006 could not be identifled. 
2. Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012) covered the study between 2004 t o  2008 and they only disclosed the 
average market share of Big Four firms (i.e. 65.2%). 
Table I indicates that on average, big audit firms audited about 67% of total Pubic 
Listed Companies (PLCs). Also, big firms have consistently dominated Malaysian audit 
market share since 1991, with the lowest share being 58.7% (1991) and the highest at 
almost 74% (2005). From 1991 to  1997, Ernst &Young had the highest number of market 
shares (Mohd lskandar et al., 2000; Hariri et al., 2007). However, in 1998, two other firms 
(Arthur Andersen and KPMG) also had similar percentage of audit market share (16%) with 
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Ernst & Young (Hariri et al., 2007). Following the merger of Price Waterhouse with Coopers 
& Lybrand, three audit firms had the highest number of audits (17%) for the year 1999, 
namely, Ernst & Young, PwC and KPMG. The above table also shows that after the demise of 
Andersen, two out of three studies reveal large audit firms' market shares have been 
reduced. This implies that the demise of Andersen had a negative impact on the selection of 
large audit firms as companies' external auditor. 
Audit fees 
The next table shows the average audit fees paid by the listed companies to their 
external auditor. 
Table II 
Average audit fees paid by Malaysian ilsted companies 
Authors/(Year) Period of study (sample size) Audit fees 
(RM) 
Che Ahmad, Houghton and Mohamad Yusof (2006a) 1993 to 1995 (1149 companies) 140,870* 
Harlri et al. (2007) 1997 (611 companies) 191,437 
Hariri et al. (2007) 1997 (657 companies) 210,495 
Harlri et al. (2007) 1999 (678 companies) 201,470 
Che Ahmad et al. (2006b) 2002 (819 companies) 194,960 
Yatim et al. I20061 2003 I736 corn~anies) 191.975 
Abdul Wahab et al. (2009) 1999 to 2003 (390 companies) 282,200 
Johl et al. (2012) 2005 (559 companies) 240,956 
Rusmin et al. (2009) 2007 (105 companies) 185,480** 
Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012) 2004 to 2008 (2210 companies) 212,532 
* This amount is derived from sum of average audit fees for big and non-big firms, divided by two t o  get the 
average fees. 
** The actual amount is USD54,553 (USDl= RM3.40). 
Table II shows that the amount of audit fees paid by the companies is more than 
RM140,OOO per financial year. There is an increment of audit fees in studies 
conducted between 1993 t o  1996, 1997 and 1998. The increments between the 
1997 and 1999 period are probably because of  the Asian financial crisis, which put 
companies in a high risk position. Abdul Wahab et a1.(2009) is the only study that 
shows audit fees o f  almost RM300,OOO paid by the companies. With the exception 
of fees paid between 1993 and 1995 (Che Ahmad, Houghton & Mohamad Yusof, 
2006a), all studies conducted after that period reveal increment in audit fees. The 
increment could be due t o  clients' business growth and complexity. 
Data and methods 
This study examines all Malaysian listed companies for the years of 2008, 2009 and 
2010. By covering a longer period, the trend of the audit market over time can be explained. 
The study began with data for 2008 companies because at the end of 2008, there was a 
global financial crisis which started in the US and the crisis also has affected Malaysian 
economies (Nambiar, 2009). Further, in 2010, the regulatory body to monitor audit firms 
(i.e. the Audit Oversight Board) was established. After the screening process, the total 
number of companies included in this study, as shown in Table Ill, from 1998 to 2010 is 
2,854. 
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Table Ill 
- 
Total 
2933 
Sample selection 
To identify t h e  structure o f  the  Malaysian audit market, several approaches as 
suggested b y  Abidin, Beatt ie and Goodacre (2010) were employed. Theexamination of audit 
market structure wasbased o n  t h e  fol lowing measures: (i) ra te  o f  audit fees per uni t  o f  size 
(ii) audit market  concentration,' and (iii) individual audit f irm's market  share. 
Screening process/Year 
Initial number of listing companies 
(Source: closing price for all stocks as a t  3 1  December 
2008/09/10). 
less: 
Annual reports are not publicly available 
Companies incorporated outside Malaysia 
Flnal dataset 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Table IV  presents number of auditors, to ta l  audit fee, including the mean of audit fee. 
Table IV 
2010 
971 
(23) 
(8) 
940 
2008 
990 
(28) 
(4) 
958 
2009 
972 
(9) 
(7) 
956 
It is interesting t o  note that  even though t h e  to ta l  number  of Malaysian audit f irms is 
slightly growing,2 t h e  same pat tern is n o t  reflected in t h e  number o f  f i rms that  provides 
audit service t o  listed companies. In fact, t h e  number o f  audit f i rms f rom 2008 t o  2010 has 
reduced by almost 10%~~ The l o w  percentage of audit f irms serving in the  PLCs' market  
might indicates t h a t  t h e  entry barrier in to  the audit market  o f  l isted companies is high. 
Particularly i n  Malaysia, w i th  t h e  implementation of t h e  AOB, it would  make audit firms' 
Number of auditor, total audit fee, including the mean. 
access into t h e  audit market  o f  listed companies are m o r e  limited. 
?he market share was calculated by dividing the number of companies (or audit fees, total assets) audited by 
particular auditor by the total number of companies (or audit fees, total assets) in the sample. The ratio of the top 
4,6 ,8 ,  10 firms was then added. 
Number of auditors 
Audit fees (RMJOOO) 
Mean (RM'000) 
Minimum (RM'000) 
Maximum (RM1OOO) 
 he number of audit firms as at 30 June of 2008 was 1,348,2009: 1,352 and 2010:1,356 (MIA Annual Report 
2008,2009,20 10). 
' Since there is no major merger or acquisition activity of audit firms in 2010, the activity is unlikely to 
contribute to less number of audit firms. The only merger event is between JB Lau & Associates with Grant 
Thornton but it was on 1 January 2008. Further, the merger did not seriously impact the market since JB Lau & 
Associates only held over 15 PLCs (Source: ~tt~://www.at.com.m~~press release 3ian2008.html). 
2008 
94 
224,624 
234 
4 
15,200 
2008-ZOlOchange(%) 
-9.57 
17.09 
2009 
96 
241,753 
253 
3 
18,100 
2010 
85 
257,281 
274 
3 
19,000 
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Total audit fees per year is about a quarter billion, and the pattern of audit fees 
indicates an increase from year to year. There are several factors associated with the 
increment of audit fees from 2008 to 2010. Due to the establishment of the AOB, the choice 
of potential auditor to  be selected has been lessened, and it would make the remaining 
firms in the market have more power (i.e. ability to charge higher fees). 
Rate of audit fees per unit of size 
To explain whether the increment of fees is reflected by size of client (total assets), 
further analysis was performed. 
Table V 
Mean audit fee per RM'000 total  assets 
Small Large 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2008 2.64 0.93 0.74 0.61 0.69 0.44 0.32 0.28 0.35 0.12 
2009 3.57 1.02 0.81 0.65 0.50 0.42 0.33 0.28 0.24 0.13 
t-stat 
***  significant at 0.01, **  significant at 0.05 and * significant at 0.10 (2 tailed), Paired Samples t- Test. 
Table Vclearly indicates that due to  fixed costs and the standardised audit 
procedures employed, the mean audit fee rate generally decreased as company size 
increased. This means the bigger the size of companies, the lower the audit fee incurred. 
Specifically, high audit fee rate is incurred for small size of companies and not for big 
companies. It is  in line with Abidin et al.'s (2010) study in the UK that economies of scale is 
beneficial for large companies. A study in an Asian country, i.e. Japan, also shows that when 
auditees have higher bargaining power, the audit firms lessen the fees charged to  their 
clients (Fukukawa, 2011). To a certain extent, the argument that auditors would like to  use 
their market power to  enjoy higher revenue is mainly applicable for small companies and 
not for big size companies. 
Auditor concentration 
Table VI reports the level of auditor concentration from 2008 to  2010. For 
comparison purposes, market share for Big Four firms (CRBIG4) i s  also presented. 
Table VI 
Auditor concentration rat io (CR) 
Note: 
1. CR4 = 4-firm concentration ratio, CR6 = 6-firm concentration ratio, CR8 = 8-firm concentration ratio, CRlO = 
10-firm concentration ratio, CRl2 = 12-firm concentration ratio, CRBIG4 = Big Four-firm concentration ratio. 
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Auditor 
concentration 
CR4 
CR6 
CR8 
CRlO 
CR12 
CRBIG4 
Total Assets (%) Audit fees (%) 
2010 
92.1 
95.0 
96.9 
97.7 
98.1 
91.4 
2008 
92.8 
96.4 
98.2 
99.1 
99.4 
90.7 
(%) 
2010 
58.4 
68.7 
76.8 
80.5 
82.8 
53.2 - - 
2010 
76.7 
85.4 
88.9 
91.5 
93.0 
76.2 
2009 
91.7 
94,7 
96.6 
97.5 
97.9 
91.1 
2008 
77.3 
85.4 
88.9 
91.5 
93.1 
77.3 
Number of audit 
2009 
76.6 
84.9 
88.4 
91.3 
92.9 
76.6 
2008 
57.9 
70.0 
77.1 
81.1 
83.3 
57.3 
2009 
57.5 
68.5 
76.2 
79.8 
82.4 
54.4 
d 
4 .  
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The result in Table VI shows that the level of concentration exceeds 50%. High 
concentration mostly associated with concentration rate that based on audit fees and total 
assets, rather than number of audits. In concentration rate that based on number of audits, 
CR4 is higher than CRBIG4. Even though CRBIG4 market shared based on number of audits 
was on a negative trend, their audit fee reduction is relatively small. A small reduction 
should not worry them since the big audit firms can recoup audit fixed cost through high 
audit fees as compared to small audit firms (Defond & Lennox, 2011). In addition, many big 
companies most probably remain with them due to  their audit expertise. The reduction in 
number of clients explains that large audit firms want to avoid new audit investment 
problem andprobably the investments not beneficial to the firm. 
From the economic perspective, in general, the Malaysian audit market has 
exceeded the tight oligopoly cut-off. A tight oligopoly is present if the market share of the 
highest four firms is more than 60% (Shepherd, 1997).~ In high market concentration, there 
is  possibility of pricing collusion, ability of audit firm to charge high audit fee and ease of 
audit market allocation among the top firms (Dopuch & Simunic, 1980; Abidin et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, whether the concentration i s  beneficial or harmful to market players and 
affects audit quality is uncertain (Francis, Michas & Seavey, 2013). According to Beattie et al. 
(2003) and Abidin et al. (2010), the presence of high market share does not necessarily lead 
to anti-competitive behaviour or indicate limited market competition. 
Individual firm market share at market level 
Table VII shows the percentage of market share based on number of audit and fees 
for individual firm. 
Table VII 
Percentage of market share (rank) based on number of audit and fees for Individual firm 
4 The modem industrial organisation study categorises markets into six types. Three market types are 
characterised by high market power and generally ineffective competition: monopoly (one firm has 100%); 
dominant firm (one firm has 40% to 99%); and tight oligopoly (four firms have over 60%). The other three 
market types exhibit effective competition: loose oligopoly (four fvms have less than 40%), monopolistic 
competition (many competitors each with a slight degree of market power) and pure competition (many 
competitors, none of whom has market power) (Beattie, Goodacre & Fearnley, 2003). 
Audit Firm 
Deloitte 
Ernst & Young 
KPMG 
PwC 
Total Big Four (a) 
BOO 
Grant Thornton 
Crowe Horwath 
Baker Tilly Monteiro Heng 
Mazars* 
Moore Stephens 
HLB Ler Lum 
Fees Number of audits 
2008 % 
6.9 (5) 
27.7 (1) 
14.9 (2) 
7.8 (3) 
57.3 
5.2 (6) 
4.7 (7) 
7.5 (4) 
2.4 (8) 
1.7 (10) 
2.3 (9) 
0.7(12) 
2010 % 
4 (6) 
28.8 (2) 
12.7 (3) 
30.7 (1) 
76.2 
4.3 (5) 
1.8 (8) 
4.5(4) 
1.5 (9) 
l(10) 
0.9 (11) 
2 (7) 
2008% 
5.4 (4) 
30.5 (1) 
12.6 (3) 
28.8 (2) 
77.3 
5.1 (5) 
1.31 (10) 
3 (6) 
1.33 (9) 
1.7 (8) 
1.2(11) 
1.8 (7) 
2009 % 
4.6 (5) 
30.2 (1) 
12.6 (3) 
29.2 (2) 
76.6 
4.6 (4) 
1.4 (10) 
3.7(6) 
1.5 (9) 
1.6 (8) 
1 (11) 
1.9 (7) 
2009 % 
6 (5) 
26.4 (1) 
14.1 (2) 
7.9 (4) 
54.4 
4.8 (7) 
5 (6) 
9.1 (3) 
2.9 (8) 
1.8 (9) 
1.8 (9) 
0.8(10) 
2010 % 
5.2 (5) 
26.3 (1) 
14.2 (2) 
7.5 (4) 
53.2 
4.5 (7) 
5.1 (6) 
10.4(3) 
3.6 (8) 
1.4(11) 
1.7 (10) 
0.9(12) 
[: * 1 
$ 
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UHY 
Total (8 firms) 
Number of companies 1 958 1 956 1 940 I I I 
Other firms 
Total non-Big 4 (b) 
Total (a) + (b) 
Total audit fees (RM'000) 
*Prior to 1 September 2008, the firm was known as Moores Rowland. The name change reflects the merger of 
1.5(11) 
26 
Moores Rowland with global structure of Mazars. 
Based on the TableVII, two of the firms from Big Four group consistently have the 
highest number of audits, namely Ernst & Young and KPMG. PwC is the third highest in 
2008, and the firm's position dropped to  fourth place in 2009 and 2010. The third place firm 
$ 
r in 2009 and 2010 was Crowe Horwath. Deloitte's market share is the fifth largest and their 
, shares dropped almost 2% from 2008 to 2010. For second tier firms; BOO and Grant 
I 
3 Thornton, both of the firms held approximately similar share, of around 5%. 
Market share based on audit fees offers different rankings. While Ernst & Young had 
the highest number of audits in 2008 and 2009, the firm was unable to  maintain its top rank 
in 2010. PwC strengthened its position, from second place in 2009 (29.2%) to  first place in 
2010 (30.6%). The gap between these two firms, however, is small, which indicates both 
firms are competing with each other. Ranking based on audit fees is not good indicator for 
KPMG, since the firm's position is lower (in the third place) than rank based on number of 
audits (in second place). For Deloitte, their share fell from fourth in 2008 to sixth place in 
2010. Crowe Horwath made an impressive performance as the firm was the fourth largest 
firm in 2010, improving from sixth largest in 2008. 
The result from Table VII implies that different business strategy is  adopted among 
audit firms. Competition arises among Big Four firms, suggesting each of them ut~lises 
different pricing strategy and client acceptance policies. A similar pattern is also observed 
among non-Big Four firms; for instance, audit firm HLB Ler Lum. 'the firm has between seven 
to  eight clients and is ranked between tenth to twelth place. HLB Ler Lum, however, is the 
seventh largest firm based on audit fee and it is bigger than Baker Tilly, Mazars, Moore 
Stephens and UHY. I t  is suggested the audit firm is highly dependent on low number of 
companies to generate income. Such dependence could be a threat to  auditor objectivity 
and violates audit quality. 
-ii 
i Conclusion p 
16.7 
42.7 
100 
This study examines overall Malaysian audit market structure. The finding show 
increment of audit fees and small reduction number of audit firms. With regards to  the 
effect of companies' size on audit fee, the bigger the company is, the lower the audit fee 
clients have to pay (i.e. the benefit of economies of scale). The analysis also show that 
Malaysia market is highly concentrated and it is a tight oligopoly market. 
It contradicts the general belief that the market is fully concentrated within the 
group of Big Four firms. In fact, a non-Big Four firms Crowe Horwarth is enlarging its market 
share. Competition among Big Four firms is mainly between PwC and Ernst & Young and it is 
suggested that PwC is focusing on big companies that result in betterment of audit revenue. 
The availability of non-Big Four firms as one of the main market players provides an early 
1.8 (9) 
28 
17.6 
45.6 
100 
0.6 (12) 
16.6 
2 (9) 
29.6 
17.2 
46.8 
100 
0.4(12) 
15.8 
6.9 
22.7 
100 
224,624 
0.6(12) 
16.3 
7.1 
23.4 
100 
241,753 
7.2 
23.8 
100 
257,281 
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sign that the dominance of Big Four firms in the audit market of listed companies has begun 
to  collapse, at least in Malaysia. 
The current audit practice indicates that high quality audit firms avoid small and 
probably risky clients. The practice may affect audit quality where dependence on certain 
type of clients leads to  firm's independence impairment. Also, disassociation between large 
audit firm and small and medium companies might increases companies difficulty to  access 
capital market and delays i t s  growth. 
The findings of this study may draw some implications. To reduce the gap between 
Big Four and non-Big Four firms, and to minimise the burden of audit firms, merger or firm's 
affiliation activities among non-Big Four firms should be encouraged. Meanwhile, the AOB 
should consider the audit firm's portfolio and their client acceptance decision aspects in 
monitoring quality of the firms. Finally, usage of Big Four firms and non-Big Four to 
represent the level of quality should be used with caution, at least in the Malaysian context. 
Instead, the usage of specialist and non-specialist firm should be promoted, since it portrays 
the reality of audit quality performed. 
This study, however, suffer some limitations. Since the study tested listed companies 
for three years, future study could extend a longer period (post AOB) and investigate on 
non-PLCs market. This study also not able to determine whether audit programme plans and 
risk management strategies are really adjusted as a response to  changes in the business 
environment. With the advancement of technology, however, the adjustment of audit 
programme is not as difficult as before. Future studies might examine how computerised 
decision aid can help to  adjust audit planning and pricing. 
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